Regardless of how convinced you are by the
science of climate change, it cannot be said that a failure to reach scientific
consensus has been the primary force preventing a meaningful redress of the
issue.
Instead, political reticence to advocate
for short-term sacrifices, for fear of losing popularity and economic standing,
has been the obstacle most ardently preventing progress. In reviewing The Politics of Climate Change, I hope to illuminate some of the
points Anthony Giddens forcefully makes about the issues surrounding political
inaction on climate change and hopefully encourage a dialogue about how we can
overcome such procrastination.
By way of introduction, author, Anthony
Giddens, is a former Director of the London School of Economics and a current
member of the British House of Lords, who has had plenty of experience trying
to advance legislative solutions to climate change. Unfortunately, he has only been relatively
successful in bringing such foresight to fruition (through no fault of his own,
I may add). Consequently, Giddens is a
credible source when discussing the roadblocks faced by those who attempt to
implement such statutory advances.
For those familiar with the issues, the
first half of the book retraces the well-worn arguments of the threat of
climate change, together with its economic and social consequences. If you are reading this blog then I believe I
shall assume that, whether it is at the top or bottom of your list of priorities,
you have an informed opinion on the matter and I won’t beat the horse to death
by replicating the arguments.
The discussion of political action on
climate change can be overwhelming, so I shall start by breaking it down into
the following categories, which I will then discuss in turn:
1.
International Agreements
2.
National Policy
3.
Control of Energy Companies
4.
Public Psychology
International Agreements
The first problematic dynamic encountered
when examining any global negotiation on climate change is the struggle between
‘developing’ and ‘developed’ countries.
The ‘developed world’ has attained a
satisfactory standard of living by developing strong economies, which by and large,
are powered by non-renewable fuels that have contributed the lion’s share of the
climate change effect.
On the other hand, the ‘developing world,’
by its very nature, has contributed fewer emissions, causing less of the
problem. Naturally, they seek to develop
their economies as rapidly as possible in order to provide humane living
standards for the majority of their populace (with little regard to what fuels
are used to achieve such ends).
Consequently, ‘developing countries’ have traditionally been wary of
restricting their own behaviour in order to address a problem primarily created
by the ‘developed world,’ especially when those measures are likely to inhibit
economic growth in the short term.
The moral weight of an effort to alleviate
poverty is hard to argue against. To
restrict the behaviour of nations that did not significantly contribute to the
problem, who seek to improve the lives of those who have so little, makes any
effort appear unjust, paternal and authoritarian. We therefore see that right off the bat, an
international consensus is hard to achieve due to differing historical degrees
of culpability and moral arguments about basic human rights.
Nonetheless, the history of international
environmental agreements started out amicably enough with the Montreal Protocol
initiated by the UN in 1987 (a multilateral agreement to reduce the use of
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), prevalent in hairspray and other products, which
were damaging the ozone layer). No great
economic sacrifice was necessary to change the active ingredients of
deodourant, so the international community was rightly ebullient and
self-congratulatory when it could address such a problem after the scientific consensus
had emerged.
Negotiations between ‘developing’ and ‘developed’
nations began to bear fruit with the invention of the doctrine of “common but
differentiated responsibility.” The idea
being that those with the best economic ability to address the problem take the
lead and allow poorer nations to concentrate on economic advances with
concessions on emissions output.
But no sooner had instruments been put in
place to address the tensions between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ nations
(through mechanisms such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and
differentiated responsibility), than ‘developed’ nations recognised the second
problematic dynamic of international environmental negotiations: international
jockeying for economic advantage.
At the UN Rio Earth Summit in 1990 we saw
the first occasion on which ‘developed nations’ opposed action on climate
change. U.S. President George Bush Sr unambiguously
announced the position when he stated that, “the American way of life is not
negotiable,” in response to suggestions that non-renewable fuel consumption
would have to be curtailed.
The 1997 Kyoto Protocol attempted to mandate
that ‘developed’ countries to reduce emissions by 5.2 % over 1990 levels by
2012. Such a mission was scientifically
understood to be an essential mitigation strategy should the worst effects of
climate change be avoided. However,
Russia, Australia and the U.S. were all notable dissidents. Vast countries, heavily dependent on fossil
fuels to transport goods throughout their economy, they were obviously
disturbed by the short-term detriment this would cause their economies.
American industrial lobbies notably
increased the pressure on successive US governments to refrain from signing up
to binding targets, arguing that joining such an agreement would lend a
competitive advantage to China.
Furthermore, Giddens explains the lengths to
which EU diplomats had to go to obtain Russian agreement when summarizing that,
“Russia at that point wanted EU support for its bid to join the World Trade
Organisation; while the EU, the leading force in climate change negotiations,
needed Russian participation in Kyoto to salvage the whole thing. So in effect a bargain was struck.” Evidently, there are no free lunches in
international negotiations, even when we are dealing with a global problem of
manifest importance.
Even with Russian support however, the U.S.
and Australia pushed for voluntary emission reduction commitments over binding
targets and consensus was obfuscated.
Thus we see that climate change negotiations
cannot be removed from the competitive world.
Despite the agreement over the need for meaningful action, international
treaties on climate change are always likely to be held to ransom by the
effects they will have on each country’s relative standing in the global
economy. No country will be willing to
bind itself to a target that confers a competitive advantage on another nation
or a greater detriment on itself.
Unanimous action will thus be nigh on
impossible when the consequences of such an agreement cannot be distributed
equally. The result of such negotiations
will therefore always be that a compromise must be found and the ability to
make a serious impact on climate change will inevitably be diminished.
Consequently, it was no surprise when the
Bali Summit negotiations proved unfruitful in 2007. Giddens noted that such economic
protectionism has become increasingly entrenched, and despairs, “If this is
success, give me failure!”
Giddens argues that we need the confluence
of four factors if international environmental treaties are to make the
necessary in-roads:
1.
Universal participation
2.
Binding emissions targets
3.
Integrated emissions trading
schemes (however, carbon emissions trading schemes have to be designed very
carefully since the wrong policies can produce perverse incentives that distort
the market and promote protectionism) and;
4.
Compensation to poorer
countries to get their cooperation.
This is without even considering the major
issue of energy security which threatens to deteriorate international
cooperation. Scarcity of energy could lead to climate change issues becoming
increasingly militarized and dominated by security risks. Giddens notes that “China’s growing influence
in the Middle East and Africa is a particular concern. Russia’s return to geopolitical prominence
has been driven almost entirely by the rise prior to 2008 in the price of oil,
gas and industrial materials.” Climate
change negotiations are thus inextricably linked to international politics, as
well as economics.
The confluence of these four factors is
proving no easier with time, yet the EU continues to lead the way in relation
to climate change policy. Such
leadership is commendable and necessary; however, it walks a fine line between
heroism and cannibalism. This is because
increasing energy costs are making it harder for European companies to compete
in the global market place when not all parties are committed to the same
emissions reduction objectives.
Furthermore, within the EU, this global
leadership/sacrifice is creating additional tension with Germany. Germany has the strongest economy within the
EU, yet one that is still heavily reliant on the competiveness of their car,
chemical and steel industries (all fuel-intensive). The EU Commission President, Jose Manuel
Barroso, remarked on the current conundrum when stating, “There is no point in
Europe setting up demanding regulations if the result is simply that production
shifts to countries where there is an emissions free-for-all.”
Giddens concludes the fraught EU position
when remarking, “The EU placed a gigantic bet that economic interdependence and
the collaboration of nations would triumph over traditional concepts of
sovereignty.” However, the EU appears to be losing that bet as Russia attempts
to undermine EU solidarity by continuing to strike bilateral energy deals with
individual member states in an attempt to broker power away from Brussels.
Unfortunately, these competing economic and
political objectives have all been exacerbated by the global financial crisis
of 2008, leading to a significant relapse in the global priority of climate
change action.
The EU, through the UN, will have to
continue to work towards achieving global consensus on climate change action. However, with such unwillingness to make
sacrifice by many major players, it is evident that international agreement
will be the finishing touch, and not the driving force, of a climate change
solution.
Consequently, we must now look to what
influence national governments can have within their own respective borders.
National Policy
The role of national government, in
relation to addressing climate change, is one of macroeconomic steering. Governments must look to address climate
change issues by rethinking industrial policy, energy markets, infrastructure
and education.
Giddens makes a compelling case that, in
order to do so, we need to enter a new era of greater state intervention. Such language is often unthinkable to those
who support the notion of free markets; however, we have seen that to date the mass
deregulation of markets has not had the intended effect. Instead, we are currently witnessing
unprecedented economic disparity between societal classes and unacceptable
levels of environmental degradation.
Furthermore, national and global markets are significantly distorted by
the unaccounted externalities of emission-intensive goods and services leading
to a situation where companies are not properly penalized for polluting the
atmosphere and the tax payer is left to foot the bill. Governments worldwide have yet to address the
problem by providing adequate price signals to effect the needed transition to
a low-carbon economy.
Such distorted price signals are
exacerbated by the reluctance of the governments to repeal fossil-fuel
subsidies. Governments are primarily pressured
into keeping such subsidies by the strength of commercial lobbyists and the
political necessity of keeping energy bills artificially low. At the time of writing, Giddens notes that
the fossil-fuel subsidies in OECD countries still total over $30 billion.
Subsidies are supposed to provide emerging
technologies a helping hand to make it to mass market, when those technologies
have the capacity to provide significant benefits to the general population
(therefore, in time, repaying the investment of the taxpayer). Their current use, artificially driving down
the price of an increasingly expensive good (fossil fuel), is neither prudent
nor sustainable.
To combat such inertia, the UK has recently
set up the Infrastructure Planning Commission and empowered it with ability to
override local governments in order to enforce a top-down transition to modern,
energy efficient infrastructure. This
kind of authority is necessary to realize the ambitious goal of a low-carbon
economy, however, we must always be careful that such power is not abused or indiscriminately
applied.
Control of Energy Companies
In the UK, we are currently seeing what I
believe to be the inappropriate use of government power on energy firms. The leading six UK energy firms (E.on, EDF,
British Gas, nPower, Scottish Power and SSE) are being called to account for
their energy prices and coerced into lowering prices. This short-term jockeying for political favour,
in the run-up to the 2015 general election, fails to appreciate the larger
forces acting upon these companies.
Energy companies recognize better than most
that a transition to low-carbon energy sources is necessary. However, such a transition will take time and
their ability to set appropriate prices to reflect the true cost of
carbon-intensive energy sources should be left relatively unfettered. Vilifying energy companies with rhetoric
about grandmothers who cannot afford to keep their houses warm in the winter
will only serve to delay the transition.
Nevertheless, no all government initiatives
are so misguided. Governments throughout
the world are implementing carbon emissions trading schemes to stimulate
technological innovation and redistributing funds for education in the sciences
in order to unleash the dynamism of capital markets on the problem of energy
transition. This is a necessary measure,
as Giddens notes, “without substantial government intervention there is
virtually no chance of effective transformation in the electricity market.” However, those who receive such support/subsidies
cannot treat it as a natural right and resist the natural change of the market
– dinosaurs must die.
What we really need is a Green ‘New Deal’ akin
to the ‘New Deal’ implemented by Franklin Delanor Roosevelt after the stock
market crash in 1929. Giddens advocates
a £50 billion investment in renewable technologies with the aim of turning
every building into a power station.
Such a deal would emulate Germany where a similar programme has created
250,000 jobs in renewable technologies industries in just a few years (for
further information, try “The Green Economy” by Van Jones).
Whether or not Giddens specific plan is the
correct one and whether or not any political party will finally have the
courage to address the issue of carbon taxes is to miss the point. The question really is, if the problem is so
cogently understood and such a plethora of low-carbon economy transitions
strategies exist, why do politicians have such a hard time implementing them?
Public Psychology
Giddens argues that the problem is
primarily one of public psychology. “Public
enthusiasm for a given policy agenda rarely lasts long, even when an issue is
of continuing and manifest importance…cynicism, unwillingness to make
sacrifices, the perception that the costs are too great, or simply boredom can
supplant the initial burst of public concern and support.”
It is therefore self-evident that the
environmental agenda cannot simply rely on anxiety about a future risk as the
sole motivator of political change as focusing incidents commonly steal the
limelight. Consider how often the
national public discourse is regularly distracted by issues political scandals
and celebrity affairs. It’s not that
some of these events are not newsworthy; it is simply that we must find a way
to train ourselves to disregard the trivial.
Consequently, one of the major obstacles to
climate change action is simply that it has to compete for public and political
attention with issues that are basically more sensational and/or easier to
fix. This idea dictates that we (the
public at large and public interest groups) must be more focused and vigilant
if we are to take meaningful action.
Furthermore, we must demand more of the news media; mandating that they
spend less time pandering to the celebratory culture and more time asking us to
critically engage in public discourse about long-term problem solving.
Giddens notes, “Worries not linked in the
public mind with clear modes of response quickly slip down peoples’ ratings of
what disturbs them most.” Consequently,
the environmental agenda must find a way to engage with people by connecting
the effects of climate change with their day-to-day life. At present the effects are too far removed:
rising energy prices, increasingly erratic weather patterns, increasing
dependence on oil-states whose dictators frequently encourage corruption and
commit human rights abuses, etc.
In order to cope, governments will have to
resort to a range of strategies while at the same time trying to foster a more
widespread consciousness of the need for action. The habits and routines of everyday life
stand in the way, in addition to the difficulty of getting people to accept
that the risks are real and pressing.
In order to address these problems, Giddens
suggests what he calls ‘radicalism of the centre.’ We must generate widespread support for
radical action that can be removed from the traditional political terrain. We must find a way to remove the temptation
for parties to sacrifice longer-term goals in pursuit of immediate political
advantage, especially when unpopular decisions have to be made (as we are
currently seeing in the UK with the debate on energy prices/state control of
the six major energy companies).
Furthermore, we need to advocate a return
to planned communities. Communities in
which constituents take it upon themselves to effect the necessary change prior
to the mandate of some bureaucratic edict.
We must call for civic pride and shared sacrifice. Britain has already
created 10 eco-towns that are entirely self-sufficient, yet these are too few
and far between.
Conclusion
International agreements on action over
climate change appear to have ground to a halt.
Russian attempts to disrupt EU solidarity by exploiting their natural
gas reserves are very counter-productive.
The reticence of developing nations to commit to binding emissions
reductions targets is understandable; consequently, we must implore the
remainder of the ‘developed’ world to get serious about sharing the
sacrifice. Unfortunately, this is
unlikely to occur while the global economy is still in recovery mode.
Instead, national governments must take the
reins. Unfortunately, it will continue
to be politically suicidal to ask constituents to make sacrifices (such as paying
higher energy bills) in order to begin the transition to a low-carbon economy
while national economies are still in recovery.
Consequently, it is up to the voting populations of each country to
generate enough political will to remove climate change from the traditional
political fighting ground. Can such a cross-party
agreement ever be reached in the requisite number of countries? Only time will tell, but I would argue that
it will become inevitable once the effects of climate change become more
visible in ‘developed’ nations.
The current politics of climate change pose
a real and significant threat to genuine progress on the issue and only time
will tell if we can act collectively before it is too late. However, the conclusion I took from this book
is actually quite uplifting. Though
climate change is a hugely complex, global problem, the solution lies in local
action. Petition your local government,
initiate your own green schemes at work, invest in renewable energy and
energy-efficiency measures at home (hopefully with a little government help)
and together we can create a movement that bypasses the bureaucracy of
international politics and generates the political will to effect change in
your neighbourhood, your country and then our world.
Score: 88
